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         Point/Counterpoint 
 
Taking Exception: Christopher Phelps Challenges Jefferson Cowie’s The Great 
Exception 
 
 Jefferson Cowie’s new book The Great Exception:  The New Deal and the Limits of American 
Politics (2016) follows his award-winning contributions Capital Moves: RCA’s Seventy-Year Quest for 
Cheap Labor (2000) and Stayin’ Alive: The 1970s and the Last Days of the Working Class (2010).  
 The Great Exception’s argument should be broadly familiar to labor historians, since a trial 
balloon co-authored with Nick Salvatore appeared as “The Long Exception” in International Labor 
and Working-Class History 74 (2008), generating debate with a number of prominent scholars. 
 The new book extends the argument, holding that the New Deal was brought about only by 
the contingency of a colossal Great Depression and the presidency of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, 
sealed by war. Weighing such variables as race, immigration, individualism, and the state, Cowie 
argues that convergences unlikely to repeat themselves laid the foundation for a more equitable 
form of political economy than existed before or since.  
 The following dialogue puts those propositions to the test. 
 
The Great Exception argues that we should put the New Deal paradigm behind us as an aspiration 
for our political objectives.  At the same time, the bulk of the book is a cogent exposition of the New 
Deal’s success in establishing a high degree of economic citizenship—at least for the white, male 
working class—producing much greater income and wealth equality in the ensuing forty years than 
before or since. Why shouldn’t we advocate a restoration of the Wagner Act to its full glory? 
 If ever there was bedrock evidence of my argument, it is the Wagner Act. The NLRA was part 
of the one big bang in the advancement of private-sector collective bargaining in the United States. 
For the entire postwar era and beyond, labor’s efforts to reform labor law have largely come up 
empty despite untold millions in lobbying efforts. Attempts to repeal parts of Taft-Hartley, eliminate 
striker replacement, or do a complete overhaul in the form of the Employee Choice Act, failed under 
every Democratic administration between Truman and Obama.  
 So there are few things more futile in American politics than reforming labor law or more 
unique in American history than its creation. Because of this, the NLRA—along with Social Security 
and the Fair Labor Standards Act—need to be militantly defended in all of their glorious dysfunction 
  
whenever and whenever possible. Witness, for instance, the overtime rules under the Obama 
administration, which make important gestures toward restoring key aspects of the FLSA.  
 While we need to preserve what is great about the old system, this book serves as an 
intellectual and political challenge to overthrow tired, golden age thinking so that we may begin 
anew.  
 
But isn’t the very concept of “the great exception” a case of golden age thinking? That is, to cast the 
New Deal order as a special, privileged island in American history is itself an idealization, isn’t it? 
 It was a privileged island for working-class Americans, but let’s not idealize it. It may have 
been an island, but waters were creeping up all around it. An era in which workers’ interests were 
embedded in the state stands in contrast to the rough seas they faced since the dawn of the 
industrial era—and have been returned to today. 
The question is not a simple binary of good or bad, idealized or pathologized, golden or 
tarnished. In the postwar era, inequality went down and prospects for regular people went up. But it 
was also very exclusive demographically and, while it had the illusion of permanence, very unstable 
as well. Let’s embrace complexity here. 
 
You treat the New Deal order as a true exception, a time when the laws of gravity of American 
political culture were momentarily suspended, with the two Gilded Ages bracketing it being more in 
line with core American values. In fact, you write of the United States as a “complex and conservative 
place” and speak of “the individualist ethos so deeply embedded in... America’s public culture.” You 
never define individualism, curiously, but isn’t this just a new consensus history? 
 Whoa, there, I never come close to claiming anything as strict as the laws of gravity! Max 
Weber did say that culture—and in this case we’re talking political culture—functioned like loaded 
dice. There is a probability that things will turn out in a particular way, but no guarantee. That’s how 
I see the main currents in this book working. 
 
Fair enough, so roll those dice. 
 Of the half-dozen themes that I discuss, individualism is certainly the most elusive—and 
fraught. I refer to individualism as ideology more than reality. But of course ideology can shape 
reality, and I think that’s where we are in American political culture. As an ideology, individualism is 
so malleable, shifting, versatile, and protean as to almost defy simple categorization. Yet it resonates 
politically like few ideas do. Look around today, and we can see many ways that twisted versions of 
the Jeffersonian anti-statist tradition remain quite prevalent in American political discourse even in 
an age of tremendous corporate power and mass culture and mass consumption. 
 Consider that Hoover was invoking “rugged individualism” just before the crash and FDR 
preferred the term “liberalism” for the New Deal because it allowed him to advanced collective goals 
with a more acceptable individualist label. Individualism may be hard to pin down, but it’s always 
there and, let us not forget, always mobilized by the most powerful of legal individuals, the 
corporation.  
 That said, as much as I was inspired by Richard Hofstadter’s work, this is hardly consensus 
history. I place at the center of the story class conflict, racial conflict, and battles over competing 
ideas about what the country is or should be—exactly the types of conflict that the consensus 
historians overlooked. What I am writing about, however, are the most general patterns. Who won 
when and why? Workers won big exactly once. If you pull the lens back from the pointillism of the 
  
new labor history, you see this is a large, diverse, fractious republic that came together nationally in 
a rare moment of relative homogeneity that delivered us to to our big social-democratic moment. 
 
Is individualism really America’s default tendency, if that’s what’s meant by loaded dice? From 
colonial mercantilism and Puritan communitarianism down through the coercive labor systems of 
slavery and Jim Crow segregation, through various republican, populist, and socialist radicalisms, on 
to Progressive do-gooder meddlesome moralism and the Great Society’s Medicaid, Medicare, and 
Head Start, plenty of aspects of American policy and consciousness have run contrary to 
individualism. Even today Americans hold so tight to Social Security that although President George 
W. Bush had two Republican houses of Congress and sky-high ratings he couldn’t privatize it. Many 
aspects of American history, whether admirable or awful, don’t valorize the individual, right? 
 I wish the other aspects of my argument got half the attention as that people devote to 
what I say about individualism, but I guess we really need to get to the bottom of this one. American 
culture is a marbling of many things. It is not unrestrained, all-determining individualism that 
completely ends in 1929 and then starts up again in 1978. Yet there is a fascinating individualistic 
strain in American politics and if you weaken that element, as happened during the Depression and 
War, then you have a different culture—especially if an entire cluster of additional things changes at 
the same time.  
The thirties and forties were far more collective and less individualistic than other times. 
Although I have differences with them, consider that Lizabeth Cohen calls it a “culture of unity” and 
Michael Denning calls it the “laboring of American culture” as distinct moments. Yet, as I argue, even 
the New Deal period reveals the continuation of a powerful strand of individualism ranging from 
those self-blaming letters unemployed people wrote to Roosevelt to the very framing of federal 
policy. To really grasp the book, you have to see it as being as much about continuities as ruptures. 
 Consider the very examples you list. Each has a collective dimension, of course. But the 
Puritans, it is said, started out to do good and ended up doing well. When the nation emancipated 
the slaves, they were given “nothing but freedom”—no collective economic resources on which to 
build a future. Republicanism can also be thought of as pre-liberalism and certainly based on 
individual property rights. The moralism of the Progressive movement was individualistic. Social 
Security was a conservative option selected because, as an entitlement to all, it would not be 
destroyed by future politicians. Nonetheless, at least according to Thomas Frank’s new book, Clinton 
was thinking about privatising Social Security until Monica Lewinksy inadvertently saved the country.  
 
In arguing that part of what created the New Deal was shutting off the immigration tap in the 1920s, 
are you giving inadvertent left cover to the build-the-wall types? 
 Let’s not confuse history and politics. As much as we’d like simply to read our political 
morality tales into history, sometimes there is a painful tension between history and politics. The 
general suspension of the questions of immigration, more or less, between 1924 and 1965 
transformed American politics and allowed the country to focus on economic questions. Few 
scholars have examined the significance of the absence of immigration in American life. I am a big 
fan of the New Deal, and I also think immigrants built and continue to build this country and deserve 
a number of routes to political and economic citizenship. This contradiction is one of the reasons 
that the New Deal makes for a problematic political metaphor for the future: in the global age, we 
appear to be locked down in a long term fight over the politics of immigration, and that creates 
obstacles to creating a politics of economic sharing and equality. 
  
 
That could be disputed, but let’s take another point. Breakthroughs, not just regressions, have 
marked the past half century, such that few African Americans, gays and lesbians, or women would 
opt to revert to 1955. These gains show our era is not a mere replay of the Victorian Gilded Age. One 
commonality of the thirties and sixties, from sit-downs to sit-ins, is struggle from below. FDR entered 
office a conservative looking to balance the budget; pitched industrial battles and radical 
insurgencies compelled his robust reforms of 1935. Isn’t the lesson here not “chastened” recognition, 
as the book puts it, of the New Deal as chance one-off, but the enduring potentiality of boldness, 
disruption, and organizing?  
 Yes, massive breakthroughs of different kinds are all over the historical record—but really 
only one great leap forward in collective economic rights. All the victories on sexuality, gender, race, 
immigration, and ethnicity are enormously important. But they are different from the sole great leap 
forward in collective economic rights and security. While many of those civil rights era struggles tried 
to orient themselves on economic security, the end result overall was enhanced individual rights to 
compete in the labor market—not a change in the structure of the labor market itself. I certainly 
think the reformed individualism of the post-sixties era is one of the great democratic breakthroughs 
in U.S. history but is more contiguous with American ideas of freedom than the New Deal.  
 I think creative thinking and activism—whether bold, subtle, disruptive, or reformist—is 
exactly what is needed, fueled by good historical awareness and debate. All I am asking in this book 
is to reflect critically on this immense set of policy breakthroughs in the thirties and forties, and ask, 
“What circumstances allowed the progressive left to win?” The left is always there in its many forms, 
and, as you and Howard Brick point out in Radicals in America, dancing between margins and 
mainstream. The answer to its success on economic questions, I think, is that we had a pretty unique 
moment of unity in which there was the largest crisis in modern capitalism, we were not fighting 
over immigration, there was a ceasefire in the culture wars, Congress removed African Americans 
from welfare in order to win the powerful white South, and we had an extraordinarily rare moment 
in which a president and Congress approached things with the urgency of a wartime emergency. The 
result was this enormous policy edifice that lasted for decades and decades—much of it still with us. 
  
A final salvo: The Great Exception ends by suggesting that instead of trying to resuscitate the New 
Deal we should revert to Progressive Era models, but by that you don’t appear to mean syndicalism 
or socialism, rather reformism. Did that work even then to foster economic equality?  
 I’m glad you raised this, as this subargument generates a lot of concern. I meant not policy 
outcomes or ideology, but rather the types of alliances and politics of the period. The New Deal 
appears like a historical bloc: the incorporation of labor into the Democratic Party, a large set of 
intertwined federal policies, and most of the political action happening in Washington, D.C. The 
Progressive Era was much more fluid and shifting. The types of coalitions that emerged between 
labor, radicals, feminists of various kinds, religious groups, immigrant groups, often proved 
efficacious. James Kloppenberg said that the period had “all the neatness of a shattered 
kaleidoscope.” I think the future lies in those types of shifting and sliding alliances, with most of the 
action on the local and state levels.  
 That’s what I mean when I suggest the Progressive Era, but perhaps we are hampered by 
historical analogies altogether! 
  
 
